Since mid-December 2018 the Sudanese population – ranging from professionals to women, the unemployed, workers, students and the urban poor – have been involved in rolling mass action and weekly demonstrations against the oppressive al- Bashir/ ruling National Congress Party (NCP) government.  A front of organisations which operates under the aegis of the Sudan Professionals Association (SPA) assumed the leadership of the uprising in mid – December 2018. The SPA is an umbrella group of unions organising academics, doctors, engineers, journalists etc. They have partnered with professional bodies, women formations, the youth and students and have a presence in most Sudanese cities. State repression against its leadership has been ongoing, resulting in detentions and the killing of more than 50 people since the protests began. Official opposition parties constitute the National Consensus Forces (NCF), consisting of the Popular Congress Party, the National Umma Party and the Communist Party. These have also been involved in demonstrations in response to harsh, IMF dictated economic austerity measures and an inflation rate of close to 70%. Early January 2019 saw Sudan’s Call (Nidaa al-Sudan) – another official opposition group – also calling for the end to the Bashir government’s rule. The forces involved in these protests therefore include the official opposition as well as extra-parliamentary forces. Former elements (e.g. the National Umma Party) have attempted to channel the essence of the demands of the uprising to a mere changing of the guard at the level of the party/ personnel running the state.

The December protests were specifically demanding the scrapping of food and fuel subsidies. The initial trigger was the scrapping of subsidies on bread – a staple for millions – which lead to a tripling in its price. Inevitable comparisons were drawn with the 2011-2013 Arab Spring revolts in neighbouring Egypt and Libya as well as Tunisia.

The significance of the upheavals lies in the fact that these ongoing protests (for close on 4 months uninterruptedly) themselves follow on wide scale protests held in January 2018.  These in turn follow on a strong tradition of resistance against neo–liberal inspired, autocratic government; a tradition which goes back to and subsequently continued after formal independence in 1956. The current slogans guiding the demonstrations, roughly translated, calls for “the Bashir/NCP led government must fall; revolution is the choice of the people; for freedom, peace and justice”. When considered closely, these demands cut to the heart of the problem in Sudan: an overturn of the existing political order and replacing it with a democratically elected dispensation. These are revolutionary in character and supercede sectarian, economistic and territorial political considerations that do exist in Sudan.  As part of the development of and advancing of a politically viable and practical alternative, the protest/mass movement have outlined transitional steps to be taken to arrest Sudan’s deteriorating economic and political situation, once the Bashir government and its associated repressive state machinery is defeated.

The recent struggles and resistance in the Sudan have seen urban centres like the nation’s capital Khartoum and the capitals and major towns of the different states/provinces of the country e.g.  the Blue Nile province (Ed Damazin) , the Nile province (Atbara) and Sennar, being the centres where protests have mostly occurred. Another dimension of the ongoing/protracted struggles in Sudan is the armed resistance undertaken by marginalised groups against the Khartoum government in regions like the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile state. These under-reported conflicts and struggles of nomads/pastoralists and farming communities in the southern parts of Sudan, are historically linked to the 2011 secession of South Sudan. The peripheral regions and the rural communities that live there have endured decades’ long economic marginalisation by the central government. The 2003/4 headlines regarding state repression in Darfur and the continued marginalisation of the region adds to the multiplicity of the conflict areas in Sudan. Defeating the al-Bashir government and the neo-liberal order that underwrites it, inevitably raises the political question as to how these seemingly disparate struggles can be combined.

One strong element in the rallying calls of the protest movement was and is to insist on peaceful protests so as to not give the regime reason to kill and maim on an even larger scale which it has hitherto. The declaration of a state of emergency in February (originally for 1 year, but subsequently reduced) has not had the effect of quashing the opposition’s struggles. The regime has been making calls to the oppositional forces for dialogue and negotiations; this the SPA has rejected outright and instead produced its own “Declaration on Freedom and Change”. Violations of the state of emergency prompted the government to establish special courts to process such cases. The rule by decree as a continuation of its repressive policies has become the norm in Sudan. The move on the part of the government to introduce constitutional amendments to allow al- Bashir to stand for re-election in 2020 has had to be put on hold. The ruling elite is clearly looking for solutions where there are none to be found. The depth of the economic, political and social crisis is such that the introduction of palliative measures to remedy the situation, is hardly going to start to satisfy the demands of the millions of Sudanese who are demanding human dignity and respect for their economic and political rights.

These struggles have to be supported by left forces and progressives in the MENA region and elsewhere, including southern Africa. Algeria is the latest county in the MENA region where similar protests have started and have been ongoing.