South Africa’s Military Campaigns In Africa

South Africa’s recent military involvement in the Central African Republic brought back images of the September 1998 invasion of Lesotho by the South African Defence Force (SADF). It entered the country, killed Lesotho citizens and defence force members, secured strategic economic points in the country and left – with the capital Maseru in ruins. Ten South African soldiers were killed. The CAR intervention furthermore reminded South Africans of the SADF and its incursions into Angola, Lesotho and other African countries before 1994; the same secrecy, the same egg-dancing around the real reasons for these military actions is again on the agenda. All the talk of parliamentary oversight over military engagements on the continent is not worth the paper it’s written on. The difference this time round is that the military escapades are undertaken by a democratically elected government. Who is the enemy or the adversaries that the SADF says it must fight? The SADF (SA Army) on its website (www.dod.gov.za) maintains that “future adversaries are likely to think and act in an asymmetric manner”.  Any rebel or oppositionist group fighting what the SA government considers being a legitimate government is therefore fair game. Spokesmen for the SA Army are extremely boastful when it comes to them being warned about the folly of these military excursions. They equate and confuse the military strength of the SANDF with guaranteed success on the battlefield. South Africa’s heightened military profile on the continent is occurring at a time when the USA, France and the UK are systematically using their so-called ‘war on terror’ as an excuse to entrench their military presence in a wide range of countries in Africa and the Middle East. Tied to this is the destructive role of South African and international weapons manufacturers/traders (Denel, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin etc) in continued and new African conflicts. These corporations are raking in billions in profit from imperialist wars of destruction in Africa. The South African government appears to be firmly set on joining these wars. A role for the SA government in this scheme of military operations is being assigned to it by international alliances and multilateral forums like the AU, the UNO-SC and NATO.

The arguments for military intervention are flimsy. The Minister of Defence states that it is done “in support of peace and stability” on the continent. A decade or more of UN peacekeeping through MONUSCO in the eastern DRC has resulted neither in peace, nor stability. The envisaged 3000 plus intervention brigade to be made up of South African, Tanzanian and Malawi troops has been armed with a UN resolution entitling it to pursue an aggressive military campaign against, amongst others,  the M23 rebel group and the population living in the areas they control. This UN resolution (resolution 2098) sets a dangerous precedent in that future UN missions can for all intents and purposes become offensive undertakings aimed at enforcing the political agenda of the dominant military powers. It does appear as if the intervention brigade was established as a replacement for, or as a precursor to the planned AU Rapid Deployment/Standby Force.   Mainstream media has reported exhaustively on the scramble for minerals and other resources in which governments, proxy forces and business interests are heavily involved in eastern DRC. The same case has been made with regard to the CAR. In the case of the CAR, the SADF was apparently invited by the ousted president Bozize to assist with military training and logistical support for its own military. The Seleka rebels who ousted the Bozize government demanded of the South Africans that they leave the country. The SA government refused. Fourteen South Africa soldiers were subsequently killed. More soldiers are to be sent into combat situations in territories like eastern DRC with which they are unfamiliar. South Africa’s expanded military involvement in Africa – as an active aggressor – is bound to create more enemies and feed the anti- South African sentiment which is fairly widespread across the continent. These interventions- like the ones before – have the effect of offering protection to political elites, not to protect civilians (the July 1995  Srebrenica massacre involving Dutch UN peacekeepers which resulted in the slaughter of eight thousands civilians should  be borne in mind.  This protection allows them to plunder at will. On top of all of these developments, the arms deal investigation has hardly helped in shedding light on the secret, murky world of business and political elites exploiting the natural wealth of the continent – at the expense of the African workers and peasants