The rule of the al-Bashir military-controlled government came to an end in April 2019 after sustained mass protests compelled the military rulers to remove this figurehead of the military junta. The ensuing political agreement resulted in the formation of a transitional government. A Constitutional Charter was adopted that spelled out the functions and powers of a Sovereignty Council consisting of 6 civilians and 5 military leaders. The period set for completion of the transition was 39 months. A transitional government was put in place, subordinate to the Sovereignty Council. The agreement between the Sudanese people’s organisations (political, tribal, trade union, women’s and most importantly, the resistance committees) and the military council held that in the first phase of rule (from 2018 to 2021) the military would lead the Sovereignty Council; the civilian section would lead the Sovereignty Council in the second period i.e., from 2021 to 2023. Elections would then be held in 2023 to elect a new government. At the time of the 25 October 2021 coup, the date was nearing for the second period of civilian control of the Sovereignty Council and transitional government to start. General al-Burhan and the rest of the Sudan Armed Forces high command – sensing that the implementation of these transitional arrangements would represent a threat to their influence and economic interests, seized power in the country in late October 2021. They sacked the transitional government and reverted to the 30-year military dictatorship characterised by that of al- Bashir and his National People’s Congress party.

Ongoing political turmoil, instability, and flux
With inflation rates in the country for 2019 and 2020 respectively being 82.4 and 124.9% and the economy suffering from a severe contraction, the scene was set for more protracted battles ahead. In the period late – 2020 to early 2021 the price of electricity rose by 500% amidst a huge outcry from the population. The Forces for Freedom and Change ascribed these astronomical price rises on the steady lifting of subsidies on electricity and commodities across the board; economic stresses stemming directly from IMF imposed austerity programmes. These assaults on Sudan’s labouring masses happens in a complex political arena characterised by territorial, ethnic, class and religious divisions. Numerous regional influences at work in the country have also made imprints on the economic and political situation in Sudan. A compelling need therefore exists for organised political, civic, labour and tribal formations to unite in struggle against capitalist-imperialist oppression and exploitation across the country. In opposition to these struggles, the military council has worked consistently to divide people’s struggles. As an example, the Juba agreement signed in October 2020 spelled out transitional arrangements dealing with security matters, regional armed conflict, and the production of a constitution for the nation of Sudan. Through this agreement, the military council under al-Burhan entered into peace agreements with armed groups opposed to them (e.g. the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement), included them in the Sovereignty Council after the 2021 coup and effectively tipped the balance of power in the county more in favour of the military council.

Following the October 2021 coup, the Sudanese labouring classes predictably revolted and embarked on sustained protests against military rule. The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and more significantly the neighbourhood resistance committees have been prominent in these uprisings across the country. Internal differences in the FFC and a split in the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) were setbacks that created opportunities for the military council to exploit. However, the one central and compelling demand of the progressive forces is for military rule to end and that a civilian government rule the country. Indeed, the 2019 agreement, contained in the Constitutional Charter was that democratic elections should be held in 2023. Supported by imperialist forces like the US government, the Gulf states and the Egyptian military dictatorship the military council in Sudan appears confident that it can – after jettisoning the agreement – re-establish military rule without fear of sanction from its international backers. The options open to the military council are however becoming fewer. Its legitimacy has been reduced to zero. Killings, arrests, and detention as part of its dictatorial rule have consistently been physically opposed by the Sudanese masses. The question now is how many other options do they have to fall back on? In this regard the United Nations is yet again playing a very sinister role. Appeals by representatives of the resistance committees, when addressing UN officials in New York for assistance and for them to at least issue a condemnatory statement of the October coup, met with a non-committal response. As could be expected, the response of the AU has been equally despicable. The Sudanese masses’ struggles and demands are deliberately being ignored and downplayed by these so-called “members of the international community”.

Resistance Committees
The resistance committees have evolved during the period of al-Bashir’s rule as organs for defence and attack. They currently exist in towns, villages, and neighbourhoods where they are actively involved in the securing and defence of the physical well-being of their citizens. The committees, revived under the aegis of the Sudanese Professional Association in the 2018-2019 period are found in most residential areas across Sudan and operate across class divides. They endeavour to transcend the political party divide that exists in many cities, towns and villages. According to the Carter Center there were approximately 5000 of these committees in existence by 2019. They are central in the organising of the numerous protest marches, sit ins, erecting of barricades and occupations of spaces such as the headquarters of the Sudanese Army in Khartoum. These have become a feature of the resistance over many years. In the key cities of Omdurman and Khartoum the neighbourhood resistance committees amongst others have been involved in settling neighbourhood disputes, acting as public authorities especially in cases there the Sudanese state fails to deliver services. In Omdurman the slogan of the RCs is “we resist, we build, we watch”. The core of these committees consists of unemployed youth and employed revolutionaries. They do school repairs, street clean ups and road works. Residents support the committees financially. The most recent instance of RCs supporting a specific action against the military council is the road blockade organised in Northern state. Here the main road between Dongola and the town of Argeen on the Egyptian border was reclosed by resistance committees after the military dismantled the barricades. From news reports (Dabanga News and Information Broadcaster, 8 February,2022) Egyptian freight drivers have attempted to forcefully break the blockade. Politically these coordinating committees, besides being central to the unfolding revolutionary processes in the country, advance demands consistent with the aims of the broader democratic movement. They are, in fact posing questions of building and using the organised political power of the working class and its allies to seize power in Sudan.

Initiatives to rebuild a national trade union movement in Sudan have encountered state repression but has not been defeated. The Sudan Workers Alliance for the Restoration of Trade Unions is one formation that issued a statement rejecting the October 2021 coup. Solidarity struggles with revolutionaries in Palestine and the struggles in neighbouring Ethiopia and Egypt can serve to bolster the cause of the working class and peasantry in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. Solidarity support from Southern African revolutionary socialist formations for the heroic struggles of the Sudanese masses is an urgent requirement.